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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Appellant Fox Test Prep asserts that there is no parent corporation and there
is no publicly held corporation that owns ten percent or more of its stock.
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INTRODUCTION
The district court went astray by misunderstanding its task at the class
certification stage: It confused whether Plaintiffs-Appellants Fox Test Prep and
Steven Price ("Plaintiffs") demonstrated the existence of common issues with
Plaintiffs' ability to prevail on those issues. That fundamental error resulted in a
misapplication of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Facebook, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Facebook")
breached a uniform contract with its advertisers. The district court concluded that
Plaintiffs failed to prove the breach in their class certification motion and,
primarily on that basis, denied certification. However, class certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) requires an evidentiary showing that common issues predonzinatenot proof that Plaintiffs will ultimately be successful on these issues. Whether
Facebook breached the uniform contract here is the common, indeed the
predominant, issue that will be determined by the same proof for Plaintiffs and all
proposed class members. Thus, Plaintiffs have shown that certification is
appropriate because the common issues will "generate common answers apt to
drive the resolution of the litigation." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541,255 1 (20 11). Accordingly, the decision below should be reversed.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

5

1332(d)

over this action asserting claims under California statutory and common law. This
is a class action in which the members of the proposed class and Facebook are
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds five million
dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. On April 13, 2012, the district court entered
an order denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. ER 1.l
Plaintiffs petitioned this Court on April 27, 2012 for leave to appeal the
district court's denial of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(f) on the ground that the decision was manifestly erroneous. In an order issued
by Chief Judge Kozinski and Judge Thomas, this Court granted the petition.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

In holding that Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim is not appropriate

for class certification, did the district court err by (a) denying a class certification
motion based on Plaintiffs' likelihood of success of prevailing on the merits of
their claim, and (b) failing to consider relevant evidence of the contract's meaning
from context, trade usage, and the duty of good faith under California law?

"ER -"
herewith.

refers to Plaintiffs' Excerpts of Record, concurrently filed
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Did the district court err in holding that the Plaintiffs would not be

adequate representatives of the proposed class?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
This is a contractual dispute between Facebook and a proposed class of
advertisers over the meaning of the word "click" in Facebook's form advertising
contract.
Facebook's contract does not expressly define the term "click" or the types
of clicks for which advertisers will be billed. ER 66, 93-101, 1379-80. It is,
however, understood in the Internet advertising industry that not every click on an
advertisement should be billed to the advertiser. ER 736. Like owners of other
major ad-hosting websites, Facebook tracks clicks on every advertisement by using
proprietary algorithms that it has developed for its advertising business. These
algorithms are essentially a compilation of computerized rules for determining
which clicks are "valid" and which ones are "invalid." ER 790. The rules, which
are not publicly disclosed, are purportedly designed to screen for objective
characteristics of a click that demonstrate if a click is from a Facebook user
intending to view an advertisement. ER 762-63. If the rules determine that a
particular click is valid because it does indicate such intent, it is automatically
billed to the advertiser. If, on the other hand, the click is determined to be invalid
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because, for example, it comes fiom a single user who over a very short time
interval clicks repeatedly, the advertiser is charged only for the initial click.
Facebook's website assures advertisers that its rules do not permit charging
for invalid clicks. ER 397. However, contrary to industry practice and those
promises, Plaintiffs and the proposed class have been charged for such clicks. The
crux of Plaintiffs' claims is that Facebook, alone among major websites,
implemented a secret policy of maximizing advertising revenue by charging
advertisers for demonstrably invalid clicks. On the merits, this case turns on
whether Facebook has exercised its contractual discretion to determine click rules
reasonably and in good faith, or whether Facebook has abused it and programmed
its rules to enhance revenue at the expense of its advertisers.
Despite arising in the context of electronic commerce on the Internet, the
legal issues before the district court were no different than a contract dispute
involving a tangible product in the bricks-and-mortar world.

Imagine, for

example, a group of apple purchasers who sign form contracts to buy apples fiom
an orchard with the understanding that the orchard will exercise discretion to select
the apples and the purchasers will buy them without inspection. If the purchasers
alleged that the orchard's apple-pickers selected inedible apples and the evidence
showed that they used the same criteria for making that selection regardless of the
particular buyer, then a group of apple purchasers could proceed with a breach-of-

Case: 12-16601

02/25/2013

ID: 8524578

DktEntry: 24

Page: 15 of 59

contract claim on a class-wide basis because the evidence necessary to prove
whether the orchard breached the contract will be the same for purchasers.
Similarly, this case is a breach of contract action involving a form contract-only
here the dispute is not over the criteria used to pick apples, but over the rules
Facebook uses to determine valid "clicks" for Internet advertising.
A.

Facebook's Pay-Per-Click Advertising Model

Facebook is the owner of a popular social-networking website, which
derives a significant portion of its revenue from the sale of advertising. ER 713.
Much of this advertising is sold pursuant to a "pay-per-click" model, under which
advertisers agree to pay for the ads based on the number of users who click on a
displayed advertisement on the Facebook website. ER 828, n.1 Advertisers can
purchase pay-per-click advertising either by using standardized, automated
contracting process on Facebook7s website, or through advertising agencies and
other intermediaries that interact with Facebook personnel. The former group is
referred to as "self-service" advertisers; the latter as "direct" advertisers. ER 81,
83. Facebook charges both groups the same rates using the same formula for
determining valid clicks regardless of their size, industry, or any other
distinguishing characteristic. ER 1378-80.
Although the contract provides that a "click" on an advertisement obligates
advertisers (both self-service and direct) to pay Facebook, that term is not defined
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in Facebook's contract. ER 66, 93-101, 1379-80. Instead, Facebook follows the
industry practice of charging advertisers only for clicks it determines in its
discretion to be "valid" or "legitimate." ER 761. Facebook uses the term
"legitimate" synonymously with "valid." ER 793. This well-established practice
recognizes that clicks should be billed only when they reflect the intent of a user to
view an advertisement. ER 736. As Facebook explains in the "Help Center" pages
on its website, it distinguishes between clicks that its counts and ones that it will
ultimately charge to advertisers. The "Glossary of Ad Terms" promise advertisers
that:
Clicks are counted each time a user clicks through your ad . . .
We have a variety of measures in place to ensure that we only report
and charge advertisers for legitimate clicks, and not clicks that come
from automated programs, or clicks that may be repetitive, abusive, or
otherwise inauthentic.
ER 397 (emphasis added).
To determine the legitimacy of clicks, Facebook and all other major sellers
of pay-per-click advertising use algorithmic-based "rules" that classify clicks
automatically in real time. ER 790. These algorithms, known in the industry as
click "filters," are computer programs that screen for objectively recognizable
indicia of user intent to determine whether each click was the result of a visitor
intending to view an advertisement. ER 762-63. Pay-per-click sellers keep secret
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the rules contained in their algorithms to protect them from manipulation, evasion,
or fraud. ER 828-29.
B.

Interactive Advertising Bureau Standards

The opacity inherent in the pay-per-click industry necessarily means
advertisers have no way to independently verify that websites like Facebook are
not charging them for invalid clicks. ER 738, 1150. However, at the core of this
bargain between a buyer and seller of digital advertising is the assumption in the
industry that pay-per-click sellers will exercise reasonable discretion by adopting
click rules in good faith that are "fairly implemented with the sole objective of
protecting advertisers from being charged for illegitimate clicks." ER 829
(emphasis in original). In other words, the pay-per-click industry expects that
websites like Facebook will not bias their rules or exploit the secrecy of the click
determination process to advertisers7 detriment. Id.

To provide formality and consistency to this nascent business model, the
online advertising industry's self-regulatory governing body-the
Advertising Bureau ("IABV)-established

Interactive

standards for "the minimum acceptable

[click] counting procedures."2 The IAB is made up of leading media and
technology companies, who collectively are responsible for selling almost 90% of

2

http://www.iab.net/clickmeasurementguidelines (last visited Oct. 3, 2012)
(emphasis added).
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online advertising in the United States. ER 313-14. In 2009, the IAB membership
unanimously approved voluntary standards (or "guidelines," as the terms are used
interchangeably in the industry) for determining what should be considered a
legitimate, and thus billable, click. ER 312. The IAB also approved standards
regarding the use of third-party audits to validate the members' proprietary click
determinations. ER 328-29, 739. Facebook, which is currently on the IAB's Board
of Directors, was one of those approving members. ER 545, 734, 1151, 1157.
At the heart of the IAB standards is its provision for third-party auditing of
click-measurement systems, which the IAB considers "critical to ensuring
consistency and trust" in the industry. ER 835. The audit standard arose in large
part from the industry's recognition that the only effective check on a proprietary
pay-per-click measurement process is third-party validation. ER 328-30, 835-36.
All of Facebook's principal competitors for pay-per-click advertisingGoogle, Microsoft, and Yahoo!-follow

the IAB auditing standards and submit to

independent, third-party audits to certify their compliance with the IAB standards
for click measurement. ER 540, 1202, 1233.
C.

Facebook's Click-Measurement Process

Like other pay-per-click sellers, Facebook does not negotiate with or
disclose to advertisers the specific algorithmic programming rules that it uses to
determine which clicks it considers valid. Facebook tells advertisers "we're not
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able to give you more specific information" about these algorithms "[dlue to the

.Facebook does not provide those
details to advertisers even when it is asked about a particular charge. ER 1023-24.
Such steadfast refusals have prompted advertisers to complain to Facebook
customer support about Facebook's blanket "trust us" mantra. ER 1036 ("So
basically what you're telling me is that the official Facebook advertising policy is
'Just give us your money and trust us because we refuse to give you any
information'? . . . when I try to find out what your policies are, your response boils
down to 'It's a secret."').
The secrecy of Facebook's procedures requires advertisers to grant
Facebook contractual discretion to write its click-validity rules reasonably and in
good faith. Understanding this grant, Facebook assures advertisers that it exercises
its discretion in a manner consistent with its obligation. The company's online
"Help Center" claims that "Facebook takes a proactive approach to protect you
from invalid clicks" and is "constantly improving our systems to identify invalid
activity." ER 15.
Unlike its major competitors, however, Facebook chooses not to follow IAB
standards, including the critical audit requirement. ER 1046, 1155, 1170.
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Thus, no third party has ever evaluated and tested
Facebook's processes for determining valid clicks or whether its systems are in
compliance with industry standards.
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The Proceedings Below

Plaintiffs are website operators who separately entered into pay-per-click
advertising contracts with Facebook after reviewing the advertising information
about Facebook's policies on its website. ER 453, 499. After independently
monitoring the visits to their websites originating from Facebook, both Plaintiffs
suspected that Facebook was charging them for invalid clicks. ER 450 at 9-1 1, 502
at 7-12. As a result, they stopped advertising on Facebook (ER 491 at 18-22, 469
at 3-5), and filed separate class action lawsuits, later consolidated, in the Northern
District of California. ER 669. Plaintiffs' consolidated complaint alleges claims
under California law for (1) breach of express contract and of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) unfair, unlawful, and fi-audulent business
practices, in violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

$5

17200, et seq. ("UCL"). ER 58 1, 647.
Facebook moved to dismiss, citing a purported disclaimer of liability for
claims "in connection with any third part[y] click fraud or other improper actions
that may occur." ER 647-49. The district court, in an opinion by Judge Fogel,
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granted the motion in part and denied it in part, granting Plaintiffs leave to amend.

ER 656. Specifically, the court held that Plaintiffs stated claims for breach of
contract, violations of the UCL, and for declaratory relief. ER 656.
After Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Consolidated Complaint ("FAC"),
Facebook again moved to dismiss and the district court again granted the motion in
part and denied it in part. ER 610. Judge Fogel rejected Facebook's argument that
the disclaimer provided a blanket protection from liability, explaining that it
shielded Facebook only from a subset of "invalid" clicks known as "click fraud"
(i.e., clicks intended to defi-aud either the advertiser or Facebook). All other types

of invalid clicks were not, according to Judge Fogel, covered by the disclaimer. ER
616-21.
In September 201 1, Plaintiffs moved for certification of the following
proposed class: "All persons or entities in the United States who paid money to
Facebook, Inc. for cost-per-click advertising during the period of May 2009 to the
present." ER 6.
Judge Phyllis Hamilton, to whom the case had been transferred after full
briefing of the class certification motion, denied Plaintiffs' motion. ER 23-24. The

3

The court also ruled that the independent claim for breach of the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing was superfluous in light of its holding that
Plaintiffs had stated a valid claim for breach of contract. ER 65 1.
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court held that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23's class-certification requirements
for two reasons: (1) issues common to the class do not predominate as required by
Rule 23(b)(3), and (2) the named plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives,
as required by Rule 23(a).

1.

Predominance. The district court's primary rationale, to which it

devoted the bulk of its reasoning, was that Plaintiffs failed to show that common
issues of fact and law predominated over individual issues as required by Rule
23(b)(3), and thus requiring Facebook's advertisers to bring individual actions
would be a superior procedure "for the fair and efficient adjudication of the case."
ER 24. The court advanced a variety of reasons for this conclusion, but all of them
are closely intertwined with and provide support for the court's view that Plaintiffs
had failed to prove the viability of their claims.
a.

Breach of Contract. The court first weighed in on Facebook's

liability for breach of contract. Because Facebook's pay-per-click advertising
contract does not expressly define the word "click" to exclude clicks demonstrably
unrelated to an expression of interest in an advertisement, the court held that the
Plaintiffs had "failed to establish" that such a requirement was "part of any
contract." ER 14. Without explaining the relationship between that conclusion and
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, the court held that certification was
inappropriate because "common questions do not predominate with regard to the
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critical issue of whether Facebook performed its obligations under [its advertising]
contract." ER 18.
The court acknowledged that Facebook's online contract links to a page in
its "Help Center," in which the Company assures advertisers that it screens out and
does not charge for invalid clicks. ER 14-15. But the court considered that
statement to be irrelevant because "[n]owhere on this page does Facebook promise
that advertisers will never be billed for an 'invalid' click, nor that Facebook will be
able to identify and screen out every 'invalid' click." ER 15 (emphasis added). The
court also declined to consider Facebook's assurance in the Help Center's glossary
that it will only charge advertisers for "legitimate clicks." ER 15-16. The court
reasoned that, because there is no direct link to the glossary included in Facebook's
online contract it correctly ignored it in interpreting Facebook's contractual
obligations. ER 15-16. Thus, the court concluded, "plaintiffs have not established
that these additional terms were part of what the advertisers and Facebook agreed
to at the time of contracting." ER 14.
As a matter of California contract law, the court also rejected Plaintiffs'
reliance on evidence of the online advertising industry's settled understanding of
the word "click" for purposes of billing under a pay-per-click contract. ER 16. The
word's usage in trade, the court wrote, "appear[s] nowhere in the documents that
could reasonably be considered to comprise the contract." ER 17. And because
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Facebook's advertising contract purported to exclude additional terms, the court
held that it could not consider interpretative evidence of the contract's text. ER 16.
The court did not address Plaintiffs' argument that, as the only party to the contract
with knowledge and control over its algorithms, Facebook had a duty to apply
them reasonably and in good faith.

In the only portion of the decision in which the district court identified an
issue related to the suitability of Plaintiffs' claims for class treatment-the
question under Rule 23(b)-the

key

court held that "individual assessments will be

required to determine the parties' intent" at the time of contract formation. ER 1718. The court considered it "highly likely that many members of the proposed class
would never have reviewed the material on the Help Center pages," and that even
class members who did read the pages may have reached differing interpretations
about the meaning of "click." ER 17. Despite its conclusion in the previous
paragraph of its opinion that Facebook's contractual obligations could not be
altered with extrinsic evidence, the court held that a decision on Plaintiffs' claims
would require consideration of Plaintiffs' individual understanding of the
contract's meaning. ER 18. The court did not, however, state whether other issues
suitable for common adjudication predominated over the individualized one it
identified. ER 16- 17.
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Injury. After doubting Plaintiffs' ability to prove that Facebook

breached the contract, the district court devoted the remainder of its predominance
discussion focusing on two difficulties it foresaw relating to Plaintiffs' ability to
prove injury from a breach.
First, the court identified Plaintiffs' "method of distinguishing between
'valid' and 'invalid' clicks" as an "area in which individualized questions
predominate." ER 18. Plaintiffs' expert witness on the issue of a common
methodology for proving liability and damages, Dr. Markus Jakobsson, testified
that he was prepared to rewrite the click algorithms and apply them to Facebook's
historical database of clicks-the

same data on which Facebook had previously

relied in determining that the clicks were valid. ER 18. But the court was instead
"persuaded, based on the analysis of Facebook's expert," that "there is no way"
that Dr. Jakobsson's methodology-which,
yet been actually implemented-could

at the class-certification stage, had not

be used for such "highly specialized and

individualized analysis for each of the thousands of advertisers in the proposed
class." ER 18. Plaintiffs thus could not, the court held, prove common injury from
a breach of Facebook's contract. ER 19-20. The court did not articulate why it was
persuaded by Facebook's expert analysis nor did it explain what was "specialized"
or "individualized" about the click determination process that precluded a finding
of compliance with Rule 23(b). Id.
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Second, the court concluded that an additional "individualized assessment"

would be "required to determine damages." ER 19. The court supported its
conclusion by noting that Dr. Jakobsson had "conceded in his deposition" that
classifying past clicks based on historical data about those clicks would inevitably
lead to some false positives "in which damages could be awarded for 'valid'
clicks." ER 19. Recognizing the "general rule" that "the need for individualized
damages, alone, cannot defeat class action treatment," the court nevertheless held
that the "difficulty of determining injury on a classwide basis" justified that result
here. ER 19-20. The court did not examine, however, whether injury would be
easier to determine if individual Facebook advertisers were required to bring
separate claims. ER 19.
2.

Adequacy. The district court also briefly addressed Rule 23(a)(4)'s

adequacy requirement, holding that the Plaintiffs should be disqualified as class
representatives under the meaning of that rule. ER 10. The court found the
Plaintiffs to be inadequate representatives under Rule 23(a)(4) because, among
other reasons, they were subject to unique defenses and failed to show "any
concrete injury from specific 'invalid'

clicksy'-although

Plaintiffs' expert

testimony established that Facebook charged them a fee for such clicks. ER 10-11.
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Arguing that the district court's denial of certification was manifestly
erroneous, Plaintiffs petitioned this Court for permission to appeal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). See Chanzberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952.
959, 962 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that discretionary appeals under Rule 23(f) are
appropriate when "the district court's class certification decision is manifestly
erroneous," i.e., where the court "applies an incorrect Rule 23 standard"). Chief
Judge Kozinski and Judge Thomas granted the petition, and this appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
To establish entitlement to class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, a plaintiff must satisfy two conditions. First, the case must satisfy
the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a), i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. Evon v. Law Ofices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015,
1028 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010)). Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least
one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs here rely on Rule
23(b)(3), which applies when ccquestionsof law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members," and when a
class action would be "superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy." Id.
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This Court reviews a district court's application of Rule 23's factors for
abuse of discretion, and factual findings made in support of that application for
clear error. Yolcoyawza v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir.
2010). Although tlie Court's review of the district court's decision is accordingly
deferential, the district court's discretion is nonetheless "bounded by the relevant
provisions of tlie Federal Rules." Gulfoil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 (1981).
A district court thus errs when its decision is not "consistent with the policies of
Rule 23." Id. A district court also commits reversible error when "it relies upon an
improper factor, omits consideration of a factor entitled to substantial weight, or
mulls the correct mix of factors but makes a clear error of judgment in assaying
them." Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Finally, "it is also true that [this Court] accords the decisions of district
courts no deference when reviewing their determinations of questions of law."
Yokoyanza, 594 F.3d at 1091. In that case, "the error of law is an abuse of
discretion. " Id. (emphasis in original).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.a

The decision below held that this case cannot be certified as a class

action because issues common to the class do not predominate over individualized
ones under Rule 23(b)(3). The district court's reasons for reaching that result,
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however, have nothing to do with a predominance analysis. Rather, the court's
reasoning leaped to a merits determination finding Plaintiffs could not prove that
Facebook breached its contracts with class members and that the class cannot show
damages for a breach. Simply put, the court adjudicated Plaintiffs' claims on the
merits before they had the opportunity to present evidence on their claims. That
was error.
It is now well settled that Rule 23 requires district courts to conduct a
rigorous analysis of Plaintiffs' claims at the class certification stage, but the scope
of the court's inquiry does not encompass a decision on the ultimate merits.
Rather, it is limited to evaluating those aspects of the merits that actually bear on
the requirements for certification under Rule 23. Despite the need for a rigorous
analysis, class certification is still not the proper stage for district courts to evaluate
the likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their claims.
Here, Plaintiffs met Rule 23's requirements by showing that their claims
depended on an interpretation of Facebook's online form contract and its
algorithms for determining "valid" clicks, both of which are materially uniform as
to all members of the class. The district court's holding does nothing to undermine
that conclusion. To the contrary, the court's reasons for holding that Plaintiffs'
claims lack merit, even if correct, would apply equally to all class members. Either
way, Plaintiffs' claims fall squarely within the definition of "common issues"
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recently articulated by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart v. Dukes-namely,

those

issues with the "capacity . . . to generate common answers" as to all class members
"in one stroke." Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
1.b

The district court's decision on the merits was not only procedurally

improper, but also substantively wrong. Although this Court need not repeat the
district court's error by deciding the merits, Plaintiffs set out the district court's
errors in detail so that the Court has a clear understanding of why the underlying
case lends itself to class certification and a subsequent adjudication of the
underlying allegations.
(1)

The district court held that Facebook's online contract did not

limit the charges for "clicks" in the manner Plaintiffs suggested. ER 17. But in
reaching that conclusion, the court ignored Plaintiffs' evidence that the use of that
term in Facebook's contract, its use in trade, and the course of dealing between
Facebook and its advertisers all provide contextual meaning to an otherwise
undefined contractual term. In doing so, the court erred under California law.
The district court's analysis further ignored a central principle of Plaintiffs'
contract claim-that

while Facebook has discretion to determine click validity, it is

bounded by its duty to act reasonably and in good faith. By failing to consider
Facebook's overarching contractual duty, the district court implicitly concluded
that Facebook's contract allows it to manipulate its algorithms to charge
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advertisers for clicks that are objectively invalid. That is an unreasonable reading
of both the contract itself and California law.
(2)

The decision below also wrongly held that Plaintiffs could not

show injury or damages. Without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the court
concluded that "there was no way" that Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Markus
Jakobsson, could distinguish between valid and invalid clicks, or between
fraudulent and non-fraudulent clicks. ER 19. This conclusion was reached by
ignoring Dr. Jakobsson's testimony that, based on his decades of experience and
expertise as a computer scientist, one could do exactly that. ER 755. The court's
one-sentence dismissal of an esteemed expert provided neither the analysis nor
evidence that a Daubevt determination would have required had the court decided
to conduct such an inquiry. Moreover, it failed to provide even the minimum of
reasoning necessary to support appellate review.
Even setting aside the impropriety of the district court's determination of
the merits at the class certification stage, the court's conclusion was clearly wrong.
Distinguishing between valid and invalid clicks is precisely what Facebook and
other major Internet companies must do to operate their pay-per-click business.
Indeed, Plaintiffs' expert proposed to rely on the same set of data that Facebook
used when it initially decided which clicks it would bill to Plaintiffs. ER 756-57.
The court's conclusion that "there [is] no way" Dr. Jakobsson could have
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performed the same exercise was therefore manifestly erroneous. The court's
related conclusion, that Dr. Jakobsson's calculations of damages would inevitably
include false positives, suffered from similar shortcomings. In any event, the need
to calculate individualized damages, as the district court itself recognized, is not a
reason to deny class certification.
2.

Finally, the district court advanced four reasons why it believed the

named plaintiffs to be inadequate class representatives under Rule 23(a). The
district court's first adequacy holding borrows from its flawed discussion of
predominance, and fails for the same reason. And the remaining reasons are wholly
without support in either fact or law. The decision below should be reversed and
this Court should order the class certified.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
PREDOMINANCE UNDER RULE 2300) BY PREMATURELY
DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.
The bulk of the decision below, cloaked in the parlance of predominance,

holds that the case cannot be certified because common issues do not predominate
over individualized ones under Rule 23(b)(3). The decision's rationale on
predominance, in turn, rests on two general conclusions: (1) that Plaintiffs did not
prove that Facebook agreed to the alleged contractual terms, and (2) that they did
not establish an injury or damages fiom the alleged breach. But the rationale is
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hardly a rigorous analysis of predominance. Rather, even a cursory review reveals
the court's conclusion is simply a reflection of its view that Plaintiffs failed to
prove the merits of their claims.
The district court's holding that individual issues predominate was based on
impermissible criteria. This Court could not be any clearer that, "[iln determining
the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs
have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the
requirements of Rule 23 are met." United Steel Wovkevs v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
593 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). By making
this judgment at this stage, the court wrongfully denied Plaintiffs the opportunity,
following full discovery, to present evidence on their claims to the ultimate finder
of fact.
A.

Common Issues Predominate Because Adjudication of the
Disputed Issues Would Resolve the Claims of Every Class
Member.

As the Supreme Court recently explained in Wal-Mart v. Dulces, the
"common issues" that must predominate under Rule 23 are those issues of fact or
law "capable of classwide resolution." Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2551. So long as a case has
the "capacity . .. to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation3'-so

long, in other words, as the questions are capable of being resolved
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establishes that interests of fairness

and efficiency require certification. Id.
The decision below turns Dukes on its head. Ignoring this Court's recent
admonition that, to the extent the merits do not bear upon class certification issues,
they should not be considered, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983
(9th Cir. 201 I), the court rested its holding on its conclusion that Plaintiffs had not,
in their motion for class certification, proved the elements of their claims. But even
assuming the district court was correct that Plaintiffs' claims will ultimately fail on
the merits-and,

as explained in Part I.B, infra, it is not-the

claims would fail

equally as to all members of the class.
The district court's rationale thus provides no basis on which to conclude
that individualized rather than common issues predominate-the

relevant question

under Rule 23(b)(3). On the contrary, the susceptibility of a class's claims to
rejection "in one stroke" would, if anything, support certification under Dukes. As
Judge Easterbrook reasoned in Schleichev v. Wendt, "Rule 23 allows certification
of classes that are fated to lose as well as classes that are sure to win." Id., 618 F.3d
679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010).
To be sure, class certification demands a "rigorous analysis" under Rule 23
that requires the district judge to take a "close look at the case." Anzchem Prods.
Inc. v. Windsor, 52 1 U.S. 59 1, 6 15 (1997) (quotations omitted). While that inquiry
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typically ccentail[s]some overlap with the merits," Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 255 1, "a
motion for class certification is not the appropriate point at which to resolve the
merits of a plaintiffs claim." Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 509
(9th Cir. 1992).4
It is the plaintiffs theory and the type of proof necessary to support that
theory that matters at the class certification stage. See United Steel Workers, 593
F.3d at 808. Thus, district courts must engage in an "examin[ation] [of] the
elements of plaintiffs' claim through the prism of Rule 23." In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 3 11 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, however, the court engaged in the type of analysis
-

4

See also In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig.,
678 F.3d 409, 41 7 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Whether the class members will ultimately be
successful in their claims is not a proper basis for reviewing a certification of a
class action." (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); Messner v.
Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) ("[Tlhe court
should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the trial
on the merits."); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 297, 305 (3d Cir. 201 1)
(en banc) (Rule 23 inquiry does not address "what valid claims can plaintiffs
assert; rather, it is simply whether common issues of fact or law predominate");
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 229 (5th Cir. 2009)
("In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the
plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but
rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met") (quotation omitted); In re
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that class
certification proceeding should not turn "into a protracted mini-trial of substantial
portions of the underlying litigation"); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000,
1017-1 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (vacating class certification denial, concluding that
"[c]lass action proponents may not be called upon to prove their case in order to
obtain certification.")
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that Costco specifically cautioned against: one that turns "class certification into a
mini-trial" on the merits. Id., 657 F.3d at 983.
Plaintiffs here proved all that Rule 23(b)(3) requires of them-that

their

claims on the merits for liability and damages for breach of contract and violation
of the UCL would be adjudicated through proof overwhelming common to the
class.5 Plaintiffs' theory of liability was that Facebook breached its contract with
advertisers by using a set of undisclosed rules (i.e., click filters) that resulted in the
charging for demonstrably invalid clicks-that

is, clicks that do not represent valid

expressions of interest by Facebook users to view an advertisement. In support of
class certification, Plaintiffs introduced unrefuted evidence that Facebook's
contracts with advertisers are materially uniform with regard to the provision at
issue here, the determination of click validity. ER 1378 at 5-6, 1379 at 9-25, 1380
at 3-9, 1381 at 4-21. Because form contracts are standardized by nature, courts
routinely find claims involving such contracts ideal for class treatment. See, e.g.,

Plaintiffs' UCL claim under that statute's "unfair" prong is based on
Facebook systematic contractual violations. ER 602. The district court's Rule
23(b)(3) determination concerning the amenability of the UCL claim to class-wide
adjudication flowed a fortiori from its conclusions respecting Plaintiffs' contract
claim-namely, its view that (i) the terms that upon which Plaintiffs rely were not
part of the contract, and (ii) there is no class-wide means of distinguishing between
valid and invalid clicks. ER 21. Consequently, no separate discussion of that
claim is necessary here.
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Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Sew., Inc., 601
F.3d 1159, 1171 (1 1th Cir. 2010) ("It is the form contract, executed under like
conditions by all class members, that best facilitates class treatment."); Smilow v.
Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (common issues of law
and fact predominated because "[tlhe case turn[ed] on interpretation of the form
contract, executed by all class members and defendant").
This case lends itself ideally for class treatment because the question at issue
that will drive this litigation is whether Facebook's rules amounted to a breach of
the contract's terms and its corresponding duty to interpret and apply those terms
in good faith. See Nat '1 Coal. of 7-Eleven Franchisees v. The Southland Corp., 2 10
F.3d 384, 384 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming certification of contract claim, explaining
that "[elach class member is subject to the same franchise agreement release
provision. The interpretation of this provision ultimately is a question of law and
can be resolved for all the class members in a single action."); Allapattah Sew.,
Inc. v. Exxon Gorp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming class
certification where relevant agreements were materially similar; whether the duty
of good faith was breached was a question common to the class, thus liability could
be determined on class-wide basis). Because Facebook's rules for distinguishing
between valid and invalid clicks are based on uniform, automated computer
algorithms, Plaintiffs' claims do not require resolution of Facebook7s culpability
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on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis. Thus, whether Plaintiffs win or lose, their claims
will rise and fall together. This is precisely how Dukes articulated the common
issue requirement. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (common question is one that
"generate[s] common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation) (citation
omitted).

B.

The District Court Wrongly Rejected Plaintiffs' Claims on the
Merits.

Even if the district court were correct to reach the merits of Plaintiffs'
claims, it arrived at the wrong conclusions. In fact, the evidence adduced thus far
in the litigation demonstrates a compelling case for a trial on the breach of contract
and UCL claims.
Under California law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the
existence of a contract; (2) the plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) the defendant's breach; and (4) damages to the plaintiff as a result
of the breach. See Vedachalanz v. Tata Consultancy Sew., Ltd., No. C 06-0963
CW, 2012 WL 1110004, "1 1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012).~The district court decided
the first, third and fourth prongs against the Plaintiffs, holding that Facebook had
-

6

California law will govern the resolution of the breach of contract claim for
Plaintiffs and the proposed class. Facebook's uniform contract with advertisers
provides for application of California law to resolve all disputes over the
advertising terms and conditions "without regard to choice of law principles." ER
346. See NedlloydLines B. K v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. 4th 459 (1992).
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never agreed to charge advertisers for only valid clicks, and that, even if Plaintiffs
could show a breach, they could not prove that they were injured by that breach or
accurately determine the amount of damages to which they are entitled. ER 14.
1.

Breach of Contract.

The district court fllrst erred in holding that Plaintiffs could not prove that
Facebook breached its contract with class members. Id. The court concluded that
Facebook was under no contractual obligation to discard clicks that were invalid
because the company's promise to do so did not appear within the four comers of
the agreement. ER 14-15. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Facebook's contract did not
expressly articulate the criteria for what constitutes a valid (or legitimate) "click."
But that gap in the contract does not, as the district court appeared to reason, leave
Facebook with unbridled discretion to set the criteria as it sees fit. That the term
does not include literally every click on an advertisement is clear both froin the
context in which it appeared, the usage of the word in the industry and Facebook's
course of conduct-all

basic tools of contract interpretation under California law

that the court ignored.
First, it is undisputed that Facebook itself explained the meaning of a "click"
in materials on its website. As an initial matter, the website pages comprising the
contract included a link to online Facebook's "Help Center," where Facebook
assured its advertisers that it "takes a proactive approach to protect you fi-om
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invalid clicks." ER 15. The Help Center further explained that Facebook employs
a system "to detect and invalidate" invalid clicks, including "[h]uman clicks that
don't indicate a genuine interest in the ad or may be associated with . . . repetitive
or accidental clicks." Id. Finally, the Help Center's "Glossary of Ad Terms"
assures advertisers that while Facebook "counts" every click on an ad, it only
"charge[s] advertisers for legitimate clicks, and not clicks that come from
automated programs, or clicks that may be repetitive, abusive, or otherwise
inauthentic." ER 397.
Although the district court was correct that this "extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written [integrated]
contract," Plaintiffs did not offer Facebook's website materials to modify the
parties' obligations under the contract. Rather, its purpose was to give meaning to
an undefined term in the contract. See London Mkt. Insurers v. Super. Ct., 146 Cal.
App. 4th 648, 656 (2007) (evidence may be considered in determining whether a
contract is ambiguous or whether there is any latent ambiguity under all the
circumstances). See also Evon, 688 F.3d at 1022 (extrinsic evidence may be used
to shed light on the meaning of language in a contract even where the contract is
integrated) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 2 12, 2 14(c) (198 1)).
Indeed, where the evidence shows that contract is "reasonably susceptible" to more
than one meaning, "it is reversible error" under California law "for a trial court to
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refuse to consider such extrinsic evidence on the basis of the trial court's own
conclusion that the language of the contract appears to be clear and unambiguous
on its face." Wolfv. Super. Ct., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 1350-51 (2004). That is
precisely what the district court did here.
Second, Plaintiffs introduced unrefuted evidence that industry practice and
trade usage demonstrate that the general contours of the term "click" do not
include billing for every click that is recorded. See Cal. Lettuce Growe7-s v. Union
Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 482 (1955) (explaining when there is a known usage of

the trade, persons carrying on that trade are deemed to have contracted in reference
to the usage unless the contrary appears and that the usage forms a part of the
contract if necessary); see also Energy Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d
73 1, 737 (9th Cir. 1980) (approving use of expert testimony to describe the type of
agreements customarily found in the relevant industry).
Finally, the district court failed to consider a central component of Plaintiffs'
theory in this case and another core pillar of California law: that in determining
click validity, Facebook must exercise its discretion reasonably and in good faith.
See Toll Bros. v. Chang Su-0 Lin, 448 F. App'x 771, 773 (9th Cir. 201 1) ("'Every
contract [under California law] imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement[.]"') (citing Restatement
(Second) of Contracts

5

20 (1981)); Cal. Lettuce Growers, 45 Cal. 2d at 484
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("[Wlhere a contract confers on one party a discretionary power affecting the
rights of the other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in good faith and in
accordance with fair dealing.").
Plaintiffs' theory of liability is that Facebook breached its contract with
advertisers by writing rules that resulted in the charging for objectively invalid
clicks-that

is, clicks that do not represent a Facebook user's expression of interest

in an advertisement. The question for trial is whether Facebook breached the
contract's terms and Facebook's duty to interpret and apply those terrns in good
faith. The district court's holding that Facebook's contract allows it free rein to
determine click validity was therefore error under California law.
Finally, the district court erred by considering whether a class member had
knowledge of or reviewed the extrinsic evidence on Facebook's website at the time
of contracting. ER 16. That question is irrelevant under California contract law.
See Rod77zan v. Safeway, Inc., No. C 11-03003 JSW, 201 1 WL 5241 113, "4 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 1, 201 1) (in class action alleging breach of Internet-based coiltract, court
found that website's "FAQ" section was relevant extrinsic evidence regarding
terrns of online contract without regard to whether class members had specifically
reviewed it); Woods v. Google, Inc., No. 05:ll-cv-l263-.TF, 201 1 WL 3501403, at
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10,2001) (analyzing issue of extrinsic evidence of an alleged
breach of ail online advertising contract without reference to whether advertisers
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read or reviewed the evidence). As this Court has explained, issues regarding a
party's awareness or review of extrinsic evidence are immaterial because courts
look to the objective manifestations of the parties' intent. Buckley v. C.A. Tevhune,
441 F.3d 688, 695-96 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App.
4th 779, 802 n.9 (1998) ("Although the intent of the parties determines the
meaning of the contract, the relevant intent is objective-that is, the objective intent
as evidenced by the words of the instrument, not a party's subjective intent")
(internal citations omitted); Ewevt v. eBay, Inc., Nos. C-07-02198 RMW, C-0704487-RMW, 2010 WL 4269259, *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (explaining that
when there is a standardized agreement, it is interpreted "as treating alike all those
similarly situated, 'without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing."' (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts

5 21 l(2)

(1981)). Indeed, the district court's holding that the case would require

inquiry into the understanding of individual parties directly contradicts its holding
that consideration of context and industry practice cannot alter the contract's
meaning. ER 18.
2.

Injury.

In addition to wrongly holding that the Plaintiffs could not prove a breach of
contract, the district court erred in holding that they could not prove injury or
damages. ER 19. The district court summarily concluded-without

the benefit of
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the Plaintiffs

had failed to demonstrate that there is a viable methodology for distinguishing
between valid (or billable) and invalid (or nonbillable) clicks or between invalid
clicks that were fraudulent and ones that were not. ER 18-19. The entirety of the
court's rejection of Plaintiffs' expert is contained in this one-sentence conclusion:
"The court is persuaded, based on the analysis of Facebook's expert . . . that using
Dr. Jakobsson's methodology, there is no way to conduct this type of highly
specialized and individualized analysis for each of the thousands of advertisers in
the proposed class." ER 19.
In reaching that conclusion, the district court, sua sponte, rejected the
methodology, and ignored the deposition testimony, of Plaintiffs' expert. ER 75860, 774-84. Although Dr. Jakobsson opined in his report and testified at deposition
that he would be able to write algorithms that made the click distinctions noted
above (ER 1396 at 77 23, 31, ER 1405 at 130:14-25)' the court stated he testified
otherwise when that was not the case. ER 19. Moreover, the court never explained
why it believed that Dr. Jakobsson's methodology could not distinguish between
the different types of clicks at issue, nor did the court explain why it was persuaded
by the opinions of Facebook's expert. Id.
The district court's summary rejection of Dr. Jakobsson's opinions was in
essence a Daubevt determination without an analysis of any of the evidentiary
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factors that a court must consider in this context. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (instructing that courts must analyze, prior

to its admissibility, whether a given expert is qualified to testify in the case in
question and whether his testimony is relevant and scientifically reliable). As the
Seventh Circuit recently explained, while a district court has discretion in
determining reliability, "the [district] court must provide more than just conclusory
statements of admissibility[.]" A772. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 800 F.3d 810, 816
(7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted)). The district court's conclusory rulings here failed to
follow the Daubert mandate, or any other rigorous analytical framework.
The method that Dr. Jakobsson describes makes use of Facebook's extensive
archival click data and employs standard algorithmic methods to essentially
"rewind the tape" and review all the clicks under a revised set of click rules that
Plaintiffs claim would suffice to satisfy Facebook's obligation to discard invalid
clicks. ER 755-58, 764-772. The result will identify the clicks for which each
advertiser wrongfully paid and which should have been discarded had Facebook

Case: 12-16601

02/25/2013

ID: 8524578

DktEntry: 24

Page: 49 of 59

employed the algorithmic rules that Dr. Jakobbson opines can be written. ER 7577
The availability of the data permitting this analysis is undisputed, and the
reliability of the methods Dr. Jakobsson describes is unquestioned as it mimics the
actual methods that are employed by Facebook and others in the industry. ER 763.
The district court's basis for rejecting this methodology was its conclusion
that Dr. Jakobsson had not identified the precise algorithmic rules that he would
employ. ER 18. Dr. Jakobsson was not, however, proffered as an expert in
determining the specific contours of these rules.' Rather, he was proffered instead
to opine whether a set of objective algorithmic rules, different from the ones

8

Another one of Plaintiffs' experts, Kevin Lee, was proffered as an expert
on that subject. A participant in the drafting of the IAB standards, Mr. Lee opined
on the proper standards for click measurement without any objection from
Facebook or a counter report disputing his opinions. ER 732-40.
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Facebook employed, could be written and then applied to Facebook's historical
data to permit a retroactive computation.
The court rejected Dr. Jakobsson's methodology because the district court
believed, without the benefit of scientific evidence to support its view, that "there
was no way" one could devise rules that distinguish between valid and invalid
clicks. ER 19. This is a wholly improper basis to reject expert testimony under
Daubevt in the absence of scientific or other types of empirical support. As this
Court noted in Costco, ccDaubevtdoes not require a court to admit or to exclude
evidence based on its persuasiveness; rather it requires a court to admit or exclude
evidence based on its scientific reliability and relevance." Cotsco, 657 F.3d at 982.
The court failed to apply this evidentiary standard.
Contrary to the district court's finding, Dr. Jakobsson expressly opined in
detail in his opening report, and confirmed in his rebuttal report, that he could
devise algorithms that would distinguish invalid clicks that are based on fi-aud
(referred to "click fraud") and invalid clicks that are not. ER 755-58, 1389-90,
1396, 1399. This is important because the former clicks are within the scope of
Facebook's disclaimer for which Facebook has no liability and the latter ones are
not.
As Dr. Jakobsson opined, it is scientifically feasible to write rules and make
click-validity determinations in the same manner that Facebook does, except that
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the new rules would have different parameters for determining click validity. Thus,
the district court's summary rejection ignored that Facebook itself performs this
very exercise in determining whether a click is billable to an advertiser. The
district court made the same error with respect to its conclusory statement that
"false" positives preclude assessing damages on a class-wide basis. Id. To the
extent that false positive may result in certain clicks being declared invalid that
should have been declared valid, that is an issue that Facebook itself confronts in
its pay-per-click platform. There is nothing in the record to suggest that false
positive renders the methodology unreliable. Moreover, even if it did occur on an
aberrational basis, it would not preclude the assessment of damages. See Marsu,

B. ?l v. The Walt Disney, Co., 185 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 1999) ('"[Tlhe fact that
the amount of damage may not be susceptible of exact proof or may be uncertain,
contingent or difficult of ascertainment does not bar recovery. '") (citation omitted).
See also Svail v. Village of Lisle, 249 F.R.D. 544, 562 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (refusing to

strike plaintiffs' expert's opinions at class certification; explaining that "although
plaintiffs have not provided information on the potential or known rate of error of
[the expert's] testing, the Court finds that [the expert's] report is both relevant and
based on sufficiently reliable methodology and valid for the Court to consider it
insofar as it bears on the analysis of class certification"). Here, the court again
summarily concluded, without citation to any scientific body or analysis, that the
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failure to predict the rate of false positives precluded its reliance on the expert
opinions. The court erred.
Finally, the damage calculation that Dr. Jakobsson proposes is a simple
mathematical calculation that refunds to advertisers in an identical manner, if
appropriate, monies paid for clicks that would have been deemed invalid under the
modified rules. ER 1387, 1389-90. As the district court itself correctly noted, the
need for individualized damages does not defeat class certification. ER 19. That is
the case here, where those damages are straightforward and easily calculated.
11.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ALTERNATIVE HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFFS ARE INADEQUATE CLASS REPRESENTATIVES
FAILS FOR MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT REASONS.
In a brief alternative holding, the district court also concluded that the

Plaintiffs would not be adequate class representatives because (i) they failed to
show "concrete" injury, (ii) they might have to litigate individualized defenses, (iii)
the proposed class is too diverse, and (iv) Plaintiff Fox supposedly knew nothing
about the case. ER 9-10. None of these reasons finds support either in law or in
fact.
A.

The Evidence Showed a Concrete Injury.

The district court's holding that the Plaintiffs lack a "concrete" injury is an
application to the Plaintiffs of its general holding that the class could not show
injury and thus fails for the same reason. As already explained, Plaintiffs' expert
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testified that his analysis of Plaintiffs' click data revealed that they were, in fact,
charged for repetitive clicks. ER 1458-1462. That exhibit was introduced at this
deposition and was the subject of Facebook's cross-examination. ER 1408-1430;
1432-1454. The district court ignored this evidence. ER 10.

B.

Plaintiffs Were Not Subject to "Unique" Defenses.

The district court's holding that Plaintiffs were subject to potential "unique"
defenses-namely,

whether they waived their breach of contract claims by failing

to dispute invalid clicks within Facebook's prescribed time period-was

clearly

erroneous. ER 10. As Plaintiffs pointed out, that contractual provision was not
even adopted until July 201 1-two

years after the named plaintiffs they stopped

advertising on Facebook. ER 83.
In any case, the existence of a potential defense to a proposed class
representative's claims is an impediment to certification only where it is "a unique
defense that is likely to become a major focus of the litigation." Tourgeman v.
Collins Fin. Sews., No. 08-CV-1392 JLS (NLS), 201 1 WL 5025152, at *12 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 21, 201 1) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord
William v. Oberon Media, Inc., CV 09-8764-JFW AGRX, 2010 WL 8453723, *4-

6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2010), afd, 468 F. App'x 768 (9th Cir. 2012). That is not
the case here. Facebook's putative waiver defense is not sui generis; nor is it one
that would become a major focus of the litigation. Denial of class certification
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based on possible applicability of defenses is appropriate where those defenses will
"vary significantly among class members." Ritti v. U-Haul Int '1, Inc., No. 05-4 182,
2006 WL 1117878, at "11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26,2006).
C.

Diversity is not a Factor Under Rule 23(a).

The district court's view that the class was too diverse also was not a
legitimate basis to find Plaintiffs inadequate. The four factors used to consider
adequacy are the (1) qualifications of the proposed representative's counsel; (2)
absence of interests antagonistic to those of absent class members; (3) shared
interests between representatives and absent class members; and (4) likelihood that
the suit is collusive. Molslzi v. Gleich, 3 18 F.3d 937, 955 (9th Cir. 2003). Diversity
of the class is not one of the factors. Furthermore, here too, the district court's
finding in this respect was internally inconsistent with its conclusion that Plaintiffs'
claims were typical of those of absent class members. ER 9.
D.

Fox Had Sufficient Knowledge of the Case.

Just as untenable was the district court's finding that Plaintiff Fox was
inadequate because "he knows essentially nothing about the case." ER 10-11. Most
courts in this Circuit have found the plaintiffs knowledge about the case to be
irrelevant for adequacy purposes. See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247
F.R.D. 98, 120 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (noting court's inability to locate "any Ninth
Circuit decision imposing such a [knowledge] requirement"). The few that have
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considered it germane have held that it presents a low threshold. See, e.g., Moellev
v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604, 6 11 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (proposed representative

"will be deemed inadequate only if she is 'startlingly unfamiliar' with the case");
Biancur v. Hickey, No. C-95-2145, 1997 WL 9857, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1997)
(same); see also Latuga v. Hootevs, Inc., No. C 93-7709, 1996 WL 164427, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1996) (proposed representative need only have "some
commitment to the case," and "need not immerse himself in the case. The modern
trend is to require little in the way of factual knowledge on the part of the class
representative. Generally, where a proposed representative demonstrates a
familiarity with the action's outlines, he or she will be deemed adequate.") (citing
cases).
The evidence before the district court showed that Plaintiff Fox fully
understood the crux of the case: he was being overcharged for advertising by
Facebook and specifically for clicks for which he should not have been charged.
He testified, that on behalf of Fox Test Prep, he was "alleging that Facebook
charged [him] for invalid clicks" and that he had been "charged for things [h]e
should not have been charged for"; understood that fraudulent clicks were not the
subject of his claims; also understood that he was acting on behalf of other
advertisers and his obligations as a class representative; would periodically confer
with counsel on behalf of the class to understand what is going on in the case; and
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was prepared to testify at trial. ER 61-64. See In re Conseco Life Insur. Mktg.
Litig., 270 F.R.D. 529, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the plaintiffs'
general familiarity with the allegations and duties as a class representative
sufficient to establish adequacy).

Thus, the district court's statement that

Plaintiff Fox knows "nothing" about the case is without support in the record.

CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the district court's denial of class certification and
remand this action with instructions to certify the proposed class.
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